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CAUTION AHEAD, INSIDER LENDERS:
NINTH CIRCUIT FINDS AUTHORITY TO
RECHARACTERIZE THROUGH APPLICABLE
STATE LAW IN IN RE FITNESS HOLDINGS
Blair Tarnutzer
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2013, the Ninth Circuit joined five other circuit courts
in holding that a court had the power to recharacterize debt as equity
in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, of the Estate of
Fitness Holdings International, Inc. v. Hancock Park Capital II, L.P.
(In re Fitness Holdings International, Inc.).1 In doing so, however,
the Ninth and Fifth Circuits recharacterized debt by applying state
law while the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits created and
applied their own respective tests based on federal law.2
The Ninth Circuit’s minority approach is sounder than the
majority circuits’ approach because its test is rooted in bankruptcy
law precedent.3 Bankruptcy law is layered over one’s existing rights,
which are defined by both state and federal law.4 When examining
whether the court had power to recharacterize debt, the Ninth Circuit
defined “reasonably equivalent value” through terms within the
 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. in Communication,
University of Southern California, May 2011. I would like to thank Professor Mary Kors for her
continual guidance, support and patience. I am also truly grateful for the editors and staffers of
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their support, encouragement and camaraderie.
Lastly, I would like to thank both my family and Murphy Troy for teaching me the values of hard
work, and encouraging me to take on any challenge. Thank you for believing in me and inspiring
me to do the same.
1. 714 F.3d 1141, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2013).
2. See James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization Under State
Law, 62 BUS. LAW 1257, 1261 (2007).
3. See generally In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1144–48 (using case law and bankruptcy statutes
to justify recharacterization).
4. See generally Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539,
539–46 (5th Cir. 2011) (combining state and federal law to explain the parties’ rights in
bankruptcy proceedings).
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federal Bankruptcy Code, including the term “right to payment.”5
For the court to define whether someone had a “right to payment,”
the court had to define “claim.”6 Given that state law, and not the
federal Bankruptcy Code, defines “claim,” the Ninth Circuit
rightfully held that state law should be used to define “claim” in
crafting the test.7
This Comment will explore the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in In
re Fitness Holdings that recognized the authority of bankruptcy
courts to recharacterize debt as equity, and how the Ninth Circuit
grounded that authority in state law.8 Part II provides a statement of
the case. Part III describes the reasoning of the court and how it
ultimately relied on state law to decide whether a court should
recharacterize a particular purported debt as equity. Part IV compares
recharacterization with a similar yet distinct concept: equitable
subordination. Part V explores the differences between the majority
and minority approach to recharacterization of debt as equity and
ultimately demonstrates why the minority approach is more
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, while also detailing the
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Part VI concludes that
the minority approach’s reliance on state law in determining whether
a claim should be recharacterized from debt as equity makes more
sense.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Fitness Holdings International (“Debtor”), a home fitness
corporation, received significant capital and investments from two
funding entities: Hancock Park (“Hancock”), Debtor’s sole
shareholder, and Pacific Western Bank (“Pacific Western”).9
From 2003 to 2006, Debtor received funding from Hancock in
the form of an unsecured loan totaling approximately $24 million.10
In 2004, Pacific Western made an additional secured loan in the
amount of $12 million, secured by Debtor’s assets and guaranteed by
Hancock.11 In 2007, Debtor refinanced its debt with a $17 million
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1145–47.
Id.
Id. at 1145–48.
Id.
Id. at 1143.
Id.
Id.
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term loan and an $8 million line of credit from Pacific Western,
again secured by its assets.12 The loan agreement required Debtor to
use $9 million dollars of loan proceeds to pay off Pacific Western’s
existing secured loan and $12 million dollars to pay off the
Hancock’s unsecured loan.13 The agreement also released Hancock
from its guaranty to pay Pacific Western.14
Then, one year later in 2008, Debtor filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central
District of California.15 A committee of unsecured creditors filed a
complaint against Hancock, Pacific Western, and two members of
the Debtor’s board of directors on behalf of Fitness Holdings and its
estate.16 The complaint sought “to recover the payments made to
Hancock Park as a result of the refinancing transaction with Pacific
Western Bank.”17 In addition, “[t]he complaint also requested
declaratory relief, asking the court to characterize the financing
Hancock provided to Fitness Holdings in connection with the
promissory notes as equity investments in Fitness Holdings, rather
than extensions of credit.”18
Therefore, “the Committee argued, the transfer of funds to the
shareholder as part of the refinancing constituted a constructively
fraudulent transfer because such funds were a return of equity and
not a repayment of debt.”19 The bankruptcy court dismissed the
complaint on the merits and converted the case to Chapter 7.20 A
Chapter 7 trustee replaced the creditors’ committee and appealed the
court’s dismissal of the claim.21 “The district court affirmed, holding
that it was bound to follow the decision of the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Pacific Express, Inc., and
accordingly, the Chapter 7 trustee was barred from bringing a

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Michael L. Cook, Ninth Circuit Allows Bankruptcy Courts to Recharacterize Loans As
Equity, Applying State Law, 130 BANKING L.J. 634, 635 (2013).
15. Id.
16. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1144.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, Ninth Circuit Holds That Debt Can Be Recharacterized
as Equity, NAT’L L. REV. (June 5, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ninth-circuit
-holds-debt-can-be-recharacterized-equity.
20. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1144.
21. Id.
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recharacterization action.”22
The trustee appealed, claiming that the “district court should
have: (1) recharacterized Hancock’s payment of $11,995,500 to
Fitness Holdings as a payment in satisfaction of an equity interest
rather than a debt, and then (2) avoided Fitness Holdings’
$11,995,500 as a constructively fraudulent transfer under
§ 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.”23
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The trustee alleged in its complaint that the transfer from debtor
to shareholder should be avoided as a fraudulent transfer because the
transfer was not a repayment of debt, but instead a satisfaction of an
equity interest.24 In order to rule on whether the transfer was
fraudulent, the court had to decide two issues.25 First, does the court
have the authority to recharacterize the purported loan as an equity
investment for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 548?26 Second, if the
court does have this authority, then the court must decide whether
state or federal law should be used to determine if the transfer is debt
or equity.27
First, the court had to determine if the purported transfer was
fraudulent.28 Under Code §§ 548 and 550, a transfer is constructively
fraudulent, and thus can be avoided by the trustee, if the debtor
“received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer or obligation,”29 and if one of the four conditions listed
in § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii) is satisfied.30 The Code does not define
22. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, supra note 19 (citation omitted).
23. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1144.
24. Id.
25. See Thomson Reuters, In re Fitness Holdings: Ninth Circuit Reverses Precedent,
Holding State Law Applies to Debt Recharacterization Analysis, PRAC. LAW (May 13, 2013),
http://us.practicallaw.com/6-528-4745.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1145.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1145.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii). The four conditions require that the debtor
(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; (II) was
engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a
transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably
small capital; (III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that
would be beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts matured; or (IV) made such
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“reasonable equivalent value,” but it does define “value”31 as “[the]
satisfaction or securing of present or antecedent debt of debtor.”32
Consequently, if the transfer from the debtor is in satisfaction of
present or antecedent debt, then it cannot be avoided as
constructively fraudulent because the purported transfer would be of
“reasonably equivalent value.”33
Next, the court had to decide whether the transfer was made in
satisfaction of a debt.34 It did this by defining the word “debt.”35 The
Bankruptcy Code defines debt as liability on a “claim,” which is the
“right to payment.”36 The Code does not define “right to payment,”
which allows the court to interpret the term.37 Specifically, the court
had to decide if the right to payment was based in state or federal
law.38
Relying on well-established Supreme Court precedent in
Butner v. United States39 and later reiterated in Travelers Casualty &
Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,40 the court
deferred to state law to define “right to payment.”41 The court relied
on deep-rooted Supreme Court precedent, which “establishe[d] that,
unless Congress has spoken, the nature and scope of a right to
transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the
benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of
business.
Id.
31. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1145.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A). Under this definition, “[p]ayment of a preexisting debt is
value, and if the payment is dollar-for-dollar, full value is given.” 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 548.03[5] (16th ed. 2012).
33. See In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1145–46.
34. See id. at 1146.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 1145–47.
38. See id. at 1146.
39. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). The Supreme Court set out to resolve a circuit split by framing a
very narrow question: whether state law or federal common law governed the subsidiary question
of “whether a security interest in property extends to rents and profits derived from the property.”
Id. at 52. A minority of circuits had adopted a “federal rule of equity that affords the mortgagee a
secured interest in the rents even if state law would not recognize any such interest until after
foreclosure.” Id. at 53. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the majority approach that the
law of the state in which the property is located should resolve the matter. Id. at 54. Basically, the
Butner Court reasoned that Congress was given constitutional authority to establish bankruptcy
law; if Congress elected not to exercise its authority by legislating a “mortgagee’s interest in the
rents and profits earned by property in a bankrupt estate,” it thereby left that power to state law.
Id.
40. 549 U.S. 443 (2007).
41. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1146.
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payment is determined by state law.”42 As Travelers stated (in
reliance on Butner), “this means that when the Bankruptcy Code uses
the word ‘claim’—which the code itself defines as a ‘right to
payment’—it is usually referring to a right to payment recognized
under state law.”43 Therefore, the court must decide if such an
interest in the company’s assets is a “right to payment,” while still
considering any applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.44
Thus, because the trustee wanted to avoid an action as constructively
fraudulent and Hancock argued that the transfer “constituted the
repayment of a debt (and thus was a transfer for ‘reasonably
equivalent value’),”45 the court had to re-examine § 548(a)(1)(B) in
light of state law.46 Specifically the court had to consider, “whether
the purported ‘debt’ constituted a right to payment under state
law.”47 The court held that if the purported debt did not create a right
to payment under state law, then the debtor’s obligation to the
transferee could be recharacterized under state law principles.48
Consequently, “a court considering a motion to avoid a transfer as
constructively fraudulent under § 548(a)(1)(B) must determine
whether the transfer is for the repayment of a ‘claim’ at all.”49
Instead of ruling on the recharacterization issue, the court
vacated the district court’s dismissal of the trustee’s constructively
fraudulent claim and remanded the case back to the bankruptcy court
with the new framework it had just established.50
The court expressly rejected the district court’s reliance on the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (BAP) holding in Unsecured
Creditors’ Committees of Pacific Express, Inc., and Pacific Express
Holding, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. (In re Pacific
Express, Inc.)51 that the Code “did not authorize courts to
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Travelers, 549 U.S. at 451).
44. Id. at 1147.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Jordan A. Kroop & K. Derek Judd, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reverses
Precedent—Courts Can Recharacterize Debt as Equity to the Extent Allowed Under State Law,
SQUIRE SANDERS (May 2013), http://www.squiresanders.com/ninth-circuit-court-of-appeals
-reverses-precedent-courts-can-recharacterize-debt-as-equity-to-the-extent-allowed-under-statelaw/.
51. 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). The BAP vacated the bankruptcy court’s finding that
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characterize claims as equity or debt” but instead “limited courts to
statutory remedy of equitable subordination under 11 U.S.C.
§ 510.”52 Instead, the court joined five other circuits and held that
courts have the power to recharacterize an obligation that,
functionally, more closely resembles equity rather than debt under
state law.53
IV. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: COMPARING EQUITABLE
SUBORDINATION TO RECHARACTERIZATION
Since 1986 when the BAP decided In re Pacific Express, Inc.,54
the Ninth Circuit has consistently held that it did not have the
authority to recharacterize loans as debt, and instead courts were
limited in their equitable power to subordinate claims under
§ 510(c).55 However, recharacterization can be functionally similar to
the concept of equitable subordination under § 510(c)(1) because
both allow the court to take something that is purported debt and, in
essence, “subordinate” the purported debt to all other general
unsecured claims.56 Although these principles may be confused, they
are vastly different in concept. In subordination, the court is
subordinating debt as the lowest priority to be paid after other debt.57
In recharacterization, the court is redefining or renaming some
purported debt as equity; thus, the court recharacterizes the transfer
from debt to equity rather than subordinating it from general
unsecured debt to lowest priority debt.58 The two concepts result in
different outcomes only if there is enough money in the estate to
fully pay off general secured debts with money left over for the

a purported loan was in fact an equity investment. Id. at 115. The BAP reasoned that, although
the bankruptcy court has broad equitable powers, those powers do not permit it to apply a
standard inconsistent with a specific, applicable provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. The court
held that “the Code supports the court’s ability to determine the amount and the allowance or
disallowance of claims” but those same provisions “do not provide for the characterization of
claims as equity or debt.” Id. The court held that the district court’s recharacterization amounted
to “subordination,” which is governed by § 510. Id.
52. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1147–48; see Cook, supra note 14, at 636.
53. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1148.
54. See supra note 51.
55. See In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1144–48.
56. See Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448,
454–55 (3d Cir. 2006).
57. JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 6:75 (5th ed. 2014).
58. In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 454–56.
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subordinate debt.59
There are many different types of subordination, but the most
relevant in this context is equitable subordination.60 Under
§ 501(c)(1), the court may “under principles of equitable
subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of
an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part
of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest.”61
This subordination is based on fairness; even if the claim is correctly
defined as debt, the court may choose to subordinate the claim if the
creditor acts in an inequitable way.62 “In an equitable subordination
action, the analysis focuses on the behavior of a creditor, knocking
down the status of a claim where a creditor engages in inequitable
conduct.”63
In contrast, in recharacterization, the court focuses on the
substance of the claim when deciding if the alleged debtor and
creditor mislabeled the purported debt as equity within the confines
of the Code.64 “In other words, recharacterization is a definitional
attack.”65 If a purported debt is recharacterized as equity, then there
is no need for a subordination analysis: under equitable
subordination, the claim is presumed to be a “claim” within the
confines of the Code.66
Another notable difference is how the court treats the party’s
formal rights in either action.67 “[W]hen a claim is equitably
subordinated, a court disregards a party’s formal rights,” but “when a
claim is recharacterized, a court determines what those formal rights
are in the first instance.”68 The court does this by focusing on
definitions within the Code and, depending on which circuit the
claim is filed in, using either an equitable federal test (in the majority
circuits) or interpreting applicable state law (in the minority
59. See FEENEY, supra note 57, § 6:75.
60. See id.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2012).
62. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc. (In re Airadigm Commc’ns,
Inc.), 616 F.3d 642, 658 (7th Cir. 2010).
63. Id.
64. See id. In the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, courts also use state law to determine whether the
purported debt was mislabeled as equity.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id.
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circuits).69
V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit joined five other circuits in holding that
bankruptcy courts have the authority to recharacterize claims.70
However, circuits are split over what a court should look to or what
law to apply in determining whether a claim can be recharacterized.71
Circuits in the majority created different federal equitable tests in
contrast to the minority’s uniform reliance on respective state law to
decide the issue of recharacterization.72 Between the majority and
minority approaches, the Ninth Circuit correctly aligned with the
minority because it followed Supreme Court precedent, specifically
Butner, in the absence of an applicable code provision.73 However,
there are unique ramifications to the minority’s decision to
recharacterize debt as equity. For all of the circuits,
recharacterization will affect the distribution of the assets for the
recharacterized interest.74 Specific to the minority approach, lawyers
must be conscious of choice-of-law clauses in loan agreements and
the potential for increased scrutiny of insider loans by the bankruptcy
courts within the Ninth Circuit.75
A. Majority Circuits’ Approach:
Equitable Tests
The Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits created and applied
various federal law tests to analyze whether to recharacterize a
purported loan as equity.76 Although the multi-factored tests vary,
the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits all relied on “authority
vested in the bankruptcy courts to use their equitable powers to test

69. See Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2, at 1261.
70. See Cook, supra note 14, at 636–37.
71. See id. at 637.
72. See Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2, at 1261.
73. Compare Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, of the Estate of Fitness Holdings Int’l,
Inc. v. Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. (In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc.), 714 F.3d 1141, 1146–47
(9th Cir. 2013) (“We now construe § 548(a)(1)(B) in light of the Butner principle.”), with
Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The
Supreme Court has held that the ‘applicable law’ is state law . . . .” (citing Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)).
74. See Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2.
75. Thomson Reuters, supra note 25.
76. Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2, at 1261.
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the validity of debts.”77 These general equitable powers are defined
in § 105, “which states that bankruptcy judges have the authority to
‘issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions’ of the Code.”78
These circuits modeled their multi-factored tests after “factors
derived from U.S. tax decisions related to the tax benefits of insider
loans.”79 The most commonly cited multi-factor test is the Sixth
Circuit’s eleven-factor test in the tax case of Roth Steel Tube Co. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.80 In Roth, the Court weighed the
following factors:
(1) [T]he names given to the instruments, if any, evidencing
the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a fixed
maturity date and schedule of payments; (3) the presence or
absence of a fixed rate of interest and interest payments; (4)
the source of repayments; (5) the adequacy or inadequacy
of capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between the
creditor and the stockholder; (7) the security, if any, for the
advances; (8) the corporation’s ability to obtain financing
from outside lending institutions; (9) the extent to which the
advances were subordinated to the claims of outside
creditors; (10) the extent to which the advances were used
to acquire capital assets; and (11) the presence or absence of
a sinking fund to provide repayments.81
The Sixth Circuit adopted Roth’s eleven-factor test, which was
then adopted by Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle
Plastics, Inc.).82 Since then, circuits have employed seven-factor,
eleven-factor, and thirteen-factor tests.83 Though the majority circuits
have not decided on one single test, each court emphasized how its
respective test was to be applied on a case-by-case basis, focusing on
the specific facts of each case.84 Additionally, although each circuit
has included or excluded different factors over others, there is one
77. Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th
Cir. 2001).
78. Id.
79. Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2.
80. 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986).
81. Id.
82. 269 F.3d at 750.
83. Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2, at 1262 n.15.
84. In re Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448,
455–56 (3d Cir. 2006).
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“overarching inquiry” to each test.85 The common inquiry is
“whether the parties called an instrument one thing when in fact they
intended it as something else.”86
To summarize, the majority courts all identified the same source
of authority—U.S. tax decisions—to create these federal tests.87
However, the courts within the majority all relied on this authority to
create different multi-factor tests that derive from tax law.88
B. Minority View
As explained above, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits are the
minority view, finding their answer to the issue of recharacterization
through applicable state law.89 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted the meaning of “right to payment,” starting with
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code statutes to define “debt” and
“value,” and defaulting to state law to define “right to payment.”90
C. Why the Minority View Is Correct
The Ninth Circuit correctly approached this issue by deferring to
applicable state law because state law is consistent with existing
legal precedent within the bankruptcy court.91 In order to understand
why the minority view is more consistent with bankruptcy precedent,
it is important to understand the aforementioned key case within
bankruptcy law, Butner.92 As described above, Butner focused on a
very specific issue: “whether the right to such rents [collected during
a period of bankruptcy/foreclosure] is determined by a federal rule of
equity or by the law of State where the property is located.”93 At the
time, there existed a circuit split between the majority group—the
Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits—and the minority

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Thomson Reuters, supra note 25.
88. Id.
89. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, of the Estate of Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc. v.
Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. (In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc.), 714 F.3d 1141, 1142–47 (9th
Cir. 2013) (“Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a
bankrupt’s estate to state law[.]”) (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)).
90. Id. at 1145–47.
91. E.g., Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir.
2011) (citing the Supreme Court’s holding that the “applicable law” is state law).
92. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
93. Id. at 49.
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group—the Third and Seventh Circuits.94 The majority group
determined that applicable state law should answer this issue.95 The
minority group “adopted a federal rule of equity that affords the
mortgagee a secured interest in the rents even if state law would not
recognize any such interest until after foreclosure.”96
Butner vehemently rejected the minority approach for several
reasons. First, Butner stated that the Constitution gives Congress the
right to create this statute, and if it chooses not to exercise that right,
then Congress has generally left this specific determination to state
law.97 Next, Butner noted that “property interests are created and
defined by state law,” and “[u]nless some federal interest requires a
different result, there is no reason why such interests should be
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in
a bankruptcy proceeding.”98 The court’s reliance on state law will
“reduce uncertainty, discourage forum shopping and prevent a party
from ‘receiving a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy.’”99 Lastly, Butner recognized the general equitable
powers of the bankruptcy court but explained that these equitable
powers are best used on a case-by-case basis, instead of creating a
uniform federal rule based upon “undefined considerations of
equity.”100 Butner encompasses the sentiment of bankruptcy law in
general: “[i]n the absence of some specific bankruptcy interest or
provision, bankruptcy courts will take non-bankruptcy rights as they
are found.”101
As evidenced by Butner, the minority circuits’ holdings are
consistent with established bankruptcy principles. First, Congress has
the constitutional power to enact a statute to address this very issue
of recharacterization.102 However, it has not yet done so and thus, the
natural step is to default to state law as Butner clearly explained.103
94. Id. at 51–52.
95. Id. at 52.
96. Id. at 53.
97. Id. at 54.
98. Id. at 55.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 56.
101. Rich Mullen, Bankruptcy 101, Back to Basics with Butner, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Oct. 27,
2011), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/throwback-thursday/bankruptcy-101-%E2
%80%93-back-to-basics-with-butner/.
102. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 54.
103. See id.
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Second, “right to payment” is defined by state law, and under Butner,
“[u]nless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no
reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding.”104
A major theme of bankruptcy law is, when a court is faced with
making a decision, it must take bankruptcy law and layer it over
existing federal or state-law rights.105 Unless there is a federal statute
that says otherwise, established legal precedent requires that the
court defer to state law.106 As of now, there is no provision within the
Code that discusses the topic of recharacterization.107 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit’s approach of defaulting to state law when faced with
defining a “claim” stems naturally from legal precedent clearly
established in Butner.108
Lastly, Butner rejected the notion of a bankruptcy court creating
a uniform equitable test without some specific power vested to it
through a statute.109 Using this same reasoning, Butner would reject
the majority courts’ differing equitable tests because, similar to the
minority in Butner, the tests are founded on some undefined
equitable power.110
Perhaps the majority’s approach of creating a federal test would
make more sense if the tests were consistent throughout the circuits,
but instead, each circuit differentiates from one another.111
Moreover, if a Code provision addressed recharacterization, then
federal courts would naturally adopt a uniform test that would help
determine when a claim should be recharacterized. Since this issue of
recharacterization is unique to bankruptcy, a Code provision
instigating a uniform federal test might be most efficient. However,
because the majority circuits each have their own unique tests and

104. Id. at 55.
105. See Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 543–46 (5th
Cir. 2011).
106. Mullen, supra note 101.
107. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, of the Estate of Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc.
v. Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. (In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc.), 714 F.3d 1141, 1142–44 (9th
Cir. 2013).
108. Id.
109. Butner, 440 U.S. at 49–53.
110. Id.
111. See Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2.
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the Code does not contain a specific statute for recharacterization,112
the Ninth Circuit approach is more logical. Without the presence of a
federal statute to specifically govern the recharacterization, the Ninth
Circuit followed bankruptcy precedent by relying on the Butner
principle and defaulting to state law to determine applicable rights.113
D. Ramifications of Recharacterization
Within the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to recharacterize a purported debt
as equity has three significant consequences: (1) the obvious change
in the order of distribution, (2) closer scrutiny of insider trading, and
(3) the increased importance of a choice of law clause in any loan
agreement.
First, if a court recharacterizes debt as equity, then the liquidated
assets of the estate are distributed accordingly.114 “Recharacterization
ensures that non-insider creditor claims will be paid first from the
available assets of the corporation.”115 Consider the following
example. Someone may have intended to make a loan and extended
credit. However, the court decides that the transfer more closely
resembles an equity interest rather than an extension of credit
(despite the formal title) and decides to recharacterize the debt as
equity. Consequently, in the case of bankruptcy, that person’s claim
is subordinated significantly below other true creditors’ claims, and
there is the risk that he may not receive any money if there is nothing
left after the estate pays back the creditors.
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s holding will most significantly
impact insider loans and similar transactions because the courts now
can review and recharacterize these specific types of transactions,
despite what the alleged creditor and debtor formally titled the
transaction.116 As a remedy, recharacterization is “most commonly
invoked when an insider purports to loan money to a company when
112. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54.
113. See generally Mullen, supra note 101 (“Although the Bankruptcy Code has since
superseded the Bankruptcy Act, under which Butner was decided, the proposition set forth in
Butner remains at the heart of the federal bankruptcy framework.”).
114. See generally Mark G. Douglas, Bankruptcy Court Empowered to Recharacterize Debt
as Equity, JONES DAY BUS. RESTRUCTURING REV. (October 2003), http://www.jonesday.com
/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=1414 (explaining how liquidated assets are
distributed if debt is recharacterized as equity).
115. Id.
116. Kroop & Judd, supra note 50.
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it is undercapitalized and the cash infusion should have taken the
form of a capital contribution.”117 Thus, claims involving allegations
of insider loans have an available remedy within the Ninth Circuit:
recharacterization.118 As a result of both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
requiring application of state law to determine whether an alleged
insider loan should be recharacterized as equity, choice-of-law
statements are now very important in drafting transactions or legal
agreements.119 As a result, how state law evolves and how a court
determines which state’s law governs the case will affect the level of
scrutiny applied to cases on insider loans.120
Lastly, because the Ninth and Fifth Circuits held that they had
the power to recharacterize by looking to state law, choice-of-law
provisions within loan contracts will be very helpful if there is
potential for a recharacterization claim.121 This is because one state
law may be more favorable or developed than another.122
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in In re Fitness Holdings is a
“cautionary tale to corporate insiders (including private equity
sponsors) that make loans to a company or attempt to cash out in a
refinancing or dividend recapitalization transaction shortly before the
company files for bankruptcy.”123
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ state-law approach
to recharacterization is superior to the majority circuits’ approach of
employing various self-created equitable tests because it adheres
more strictly to Supreme Court precedent, best established in Butner.
However, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on state law poses potential
problems that attorneys should carefully draft around and take into

117. Douglas, supra note 114.
118. Kroop & Judd, supra note 50.
119. Ninth Circuit Widens Circuit Split Over Application of State or Federal Bankruptcy Law
To Determine Whether Claims of Insider-Lenders Should be Recharacterized as Equity, ROPES &
GRAY ALERT (May 3, 2013), http://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/alerts/2013/05/20130503
_BBR_Alert.pdf.
120. See id.
121. See Lisa G. Laukitis and Mark G. Douglas, A Cautionary Tale for Insider Lenders: Ninth
Circuit Endorses Recharacterization Remedy in Bankruptcy, JONES DAY (July/Aug. 2013),
http://www.jonesday.com/a-cautionary-tale-for-insider-lenders-ninth-circuit-endorsesrecharacterization-remedy-in-bankruptcy-07-31-2013/.
122. See id.
123. Id.
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account when advising their clients.124 Specifically, attorneys should
pay close attention to choice-of-law clauses in loan agreements,
depending on which state law the client finds preferable. Also,
attorneys should advise clients knowing that courts will look at
insider loans with closer scrutiny now that courts have the authority
to recharacterize the purported debt into equity. Ultimately, the
newly recognized remedy of recharacterization in the Ninth Circuit
will make lenders think twice before signing any loan agreement.

124. See id.

